Why Justice Rehnquist Thought It Was OK To Regulate the Political Speech of Corporations

I've replied in Jim Quinn's forum, The Burning Platform, to 3 questions raised by a proponent of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in last week's Citizens United case, and I thought it would make sense to re-post those answers here (plus a few minor edits), with hyperlinks to the sources. The source of my answers is the 1978 dissent of Justice Rehnquist in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti:

<<1.  Which part of the Constitution authorizes Congress to make law selectively banning political speech by certain groups of people?>> 

No part. Corporations and unions are not people. The people within those corporations and unions have full rights of political speech: if Michael Moore, the "natural person" (assuming, for purposes of argument, that he is one), makes a movie trashing Hillary Clinton or anybody else, he is free to do so, at any time before, during, or after an election; but if he and his acolytes form a corporation or other organization that, under state or federal law, enjoys "special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons," then that non-natural person is subject to state and federal regulation -- within certain limits (more about this below). In other words, it's natural persons who are born with inalienable rights, not non-natural persons (corporations, unions, etc. ... from here on in, I'll just refer to these as "corporations"). A corporation has only those rights that are expressly granted to it in its charter, under applicable state or Federal law, or that are "incidental to its very existence."

<<2.  How is it proper (much less constitutional) to make a law that bans speech by some corporations (Citizens United, Citibank) but not other corporations (CBS, NY Times)?>>

Because a corporation is protected as to rights expressly granted to it by charter or "incidental to its very existence:"

- "when a State creates a corporation with the power to acquire and utility property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law;" and therefore,

 - "Likewise, when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business." --  BUT "it does not follow that such a corporation would be entitled to all the rights of free expression enjoyed by natural persons. Although a newspaper corporation must necessarily have the liberty to endorse a political candidate in its editorial columns, it need have no greater right than any other corporation to contribute money to that candidate's campaign. Such a right is no more 'incidental to its very existence' than any other business corporation."

<<3.  If you can cite the Constitutional Authority for Congress to selectively ban speech, why do you consider the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional – or do you maintain that they were just fine?>>

(I am limiting my response to the Sedition Act - the one that expired when Jefferson and his buds took over from Adams after the election of 1800) Because they sought to curtail the full rights of political speech of natural persons. As noted in #1 above, the First Amendment says that the Federal government (and the 14th Amendment says that state governments) can't do that.

I find Justice Rehnquist's reasoning unassailable. I think it's a much sounder constitutional standard than anything I read in Citizens United.